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Chapter XX 
South Korean System of Innovation: From 
Imitation to Frontiers of Technology, Successes 
and Limitations  
Aouatif El Fakir1 
Institut de Recherche Internationale, Dauphine University, Paris, 
France  
 
In this chapter, we use an analytical framework based on the “national 
system of innovation” approach to understand how South Korea 
acquired technological capabilities, increased the effectiveness of its 
national system of innovation and became a major player in many high-
tech industries. 
1. Introduction 
Some developing countries have emerged as serious competitors in new 
areas of technology. How did they acquire the necessary capabilities to 
use technology and even to develop it? And how did they make their 
systems of innovation more sophisticated? 
This chapter will examine the case of South Korea to understand how 
it has acquired technological capabilities and increased the effectiveness 
of its national system of innovation to become a major player in many 
high-tech industries. 
                                                
1  The Author is grateful to Mostafa Hashem Sherif for the support received in the preparation of the 
manuscript. 
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We use an analytical framework based on the “national system of 
innovation” approach to clarify this process. We assume that countries 
acquire capabilities to produce new goods, services and technologies 
through interactive learning spaces (ILS). The effectiveness of these 
spaces depends on how technologies, institutions and organisations 
evolve simultaneously. 
Section 1 contains a critical review of the literature on the acquisition 
of technological capabilities. In section 2, we present the analytical 
framework based on the national system of innovation approach. In 
section 3, we use this framework to examine the case of South Korea. 
We conclude with a discussion on developing countries in terms of the 
relationship between technology and development. 
2. The Acquisition of Technological Capabilities in Developing 
Countries: Theories and Approaches 
The study of technology in developing countries started in the 1960’s. 
Until the mid seventies, the main corpus of literature was called the 
Theory of Technological Dependency. This theory considers that 
technologies that are already developed elsewhere should not be 
reinvented but must be exploited under the following two conditions: the 
technology should be appropriate to a country’s needs and it should be 
available at a reasonable cost. The theory also highlights the role of 
foreign investments and multinationals companies in the transfer of 
technology (Gerschenkron, 1962; Helleiner 1975).  
From the mid seventies to the mid eighties, many scholars assumed 
that indigenous science can be more responsive to national needs than 
technology imports. The effectiveness of the National System of Science, 
Technology and Innovation (S&T&I) depends on some conditions like 
long term investments, efforts to accumulate knowledge, and skills and 
know-how, selection of the right R&D fields, effective institutional 
support and international (Jones, 1971; Cooper, 1973; Herrera, 1973; 
Sagasti, 2004). 
The 1980’s witnessed the emergence of the Theory of Technological 
Capabilities. It stipulates that imported technology cannot be used if it 
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does not match the scale, skills and material needs of the new 
environment. Therefore, developing countries can not take advantage of 
imported technologies without a threshold of technological capabilities 
(Bell, 1984; Dahlman, Ross-Larsonn and Westphal, 1987; Fransman and 
King, 1984; Katz, 1987; Lall 1987). 
At the end of the 1980’s, the Windows of Opportunity Theory 
assumed that co-evolution of technology, institutions and organisations is 
essential for catching up and growth. The time needed to learn and the 
perspectives for growth depend on the technology. Developing countries 
must identify clearly the current stage of the technology and acquire the 
suitable combination of productive and institutional infrastructure, 
scientific/technical knowledge and experience. The cost of these 
components changes in each stage of the technology life cycle. It is 
lower in the emerging and mature stages of technology and higher in the 
growth phase (Perez and Soete, 1988; Perez, 2001).  
While all these approaches and theories have illuminated many 
fundamental aspects on the technology transfer to developing countries, 
they lack an overall vision of how developing countries can acquire 
capabilities to use, adapt, improve and even develop technologies.  
As a consequence, we propose to use the National System of 
Innovation (NSI) approach, because it could help to identify the actors 
and the mechanisms that determine the success of innovation and 
technological development processes. This approach emerged in the 
1980’s and the 1990’s as an analytical framework in developed 
countries. It assumes that innovations result from interactive learning 
processes and the co-evolution of technologies, institutions and 
organisations. Here, innovations mean using new technologies, adapting, 
improving and even developing them (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). 
3. The National System of Innovation (NSI) Approach 
According to NSI approach, innovations (not inventions) occur within a 
specific system in which stakeholders interact and learn from each other 
to take advantage of technological and market opportunities.  
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Interactive learning is the main process leading to innovation because 
it enables individuals and organisations to acquire new knowledge and 
new skills to improve their performances, to seize opportunities and to 
face pressures (Lundvall, 1992; Mckelvey, 1997) Moreover, this 
approach emphasizes the uncertainty of the innovation process and the 
need for an appropriate institutional framework (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Saviotti, 1997). 
Although the NSI approach highlights systemic and dynamic aspects 
of the innovation, it has some limitations. It is based on the observation 
of sophisticated and complex innovation systems in developed countries. 
As a consequence, we had to adapt it to the context of developing 
countries because of the following reasons. First, the behaviour and 
objectives of the corresponding organisations and institutions differ. 
Second, the NSI indicators for developing countries deal with systems 
under construction. Finally, developing countries are operating in the 
context of a globalized R&D where technological alliances can play a 
significant role in technology acquisition. 
Empirical studies of NSIs in developing countries, such as the 
comparative study of Dahlman and Nelson (1995), have confirmed that 
the macroeconomic environment and incentives regime determine 
technological and economic performance. In addition, resources like 
appropriate human capital, foreign technologies, industrial infrastructure, 
public support and funding are crucial for the acquisition of 
technological capabilities. 
Arocena and Sutz’s theoretical works about innovation in developing 
countries highlighted that developing countries lack “interactive learning 
spaces” which are “interactive activities and processes where individuals 
and organisations generate, transfer and use systemically knowledge to 
enhance their ability to learn and to resolve problems.” (Arocena and 
Sutz, 2002). These interactive learning spaces (ILS) facilitate the 
resolution of pressing problems of production by the encounter of actors 
owning the problems with “knowledge” actors  
So, we assume here that these ILS cannot emerge if there are no 
incentives and pressures on firms to be more competitive and if they do 
not have the resources to participate in processes to generate, transfer and 
use knowledge. We also assume that in these learning spaces, firms 
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acquire new technological capabilities and the national system of 
innovation emerges. As these spaces become systemic, firms strengthen 
their technological capabilities and the NSI becomes more sophisticated 
and effective. 
4. The Acquisition of Technological Capabilities in South Korea 
South Korea achieved a very fast development process in the last forty 
years and emerged as a competitive supplier in many medium and high 
tech industries. First, we note the incentives/pressures that pushed 
Korean firms to enter in ILS. We then examine the resources they used to 
resolve production and innovation problems. We will observe how 
spaces, resources and capabilities have evolved from 1960 until now. 
Our study is based on the works of Kim (1980, 1993, 2000), Westphal, 
Rhee and Pursell (1985), Westphal, Kim and Dahlman (1985), Kim and 
Yi (1997), Kim and Lee (1987) and Lim (1999). Table 1 provides figures 
on the growth the GDP (gross domestic product) and GDP per capita in 
South Korea from 1960 to 2000. Table 2 shows the evolution of exports 
from 1966 to 2000. It seen that, in addition to their dramatic growth over 
the last four decades, their technological content has continuously 
progressed to higher values. 
The South Korean technological, industrial and economic progress 
has gone through 4 stages. In the 1960’s, South Korea was oriented to 
import substitution before switching to export promotion. This phase 
witnessed the set up and strengthening of production capabilities2. The 
1970’s was the period of increasing exports, the establishment of heavy 
industries and the development of investment capabilities3. High-tech 
industries and local R&D activities emerged during the 1980’s. In the 
third phase, industries and activities were strengthened during the 1990’s 
                                                
2 Production capabilities include the supervision of production facilities, raw materials 
control, production planning, quality control, production problems resolutions, process 
and product adaptation, facilities repairing and maintenance and marketing (Westphal 
Rhee and Pursell, 1985). 
3 Investment capabilities include labour force training, feasibility studies, projects 
implementation, management and engineering, specific studies, basic and specific 
engineering and purchasing. Ibid.  
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despite the financial crisis and some industrial and institutional failures. 
In the current phase, which started in 1997, South Korea has undertaken 
many reforms which put it on a new growth virtuous spiral, but some 
limitations prevent it from becoming a knowledge and innovation 
economy.  
 
 
Table 1: GDP and GDP per capita of South Korea 1960-2000. 
 South Korean System of Innovation 7 
Year GDP 
(current 
billion. US$) 
GDP per 
capita, 
Purchasing 
Power Parity 
(current 
international 
($) 
1960 3.9 155 
1965 3.0 108 
1970 8.9 275 
1975 21.5 599 
1980 63.8 1632 
1985 96.6 2290 
1990 263.8 5893 
1995 517.1 10850 
2000 511.7 9763 
  Source: World Bank.World Development Indicators Database.  
Table 2: Structure of exports of South Korea 1966-2000 
 Type of Export (%) 1966 1976 1987 1995 2000 
Primary products 37.9 10.1 6.4 3 2 
Resources based manufactures  12.5 6.2 3.4 7 11 
Low tech manufactures  41.8 55.5 52.3 20 17 
Medium tech manufactures 0.4 4.4 13.7 35 33 
High tech manufactures 1.3 6.7 21.8 30 36 
Source: Calculated from international trade statistics, SITC Rev.2. OECD. 2005.  
4.1 Keys of success  
This success cannot be objectively explained without speaking 
about the U.S. assistance during the cold war and the major role of 
Korean government nationalism and culture. In fact, during 
1950’s, American aid was vital for the reconstruction and 
industrialization of South Korea after Korean War. Until 1961, 
70% of public investments were funded by U.S. aid (military aid 
from 1953 to 1961 amounted to 1561 million U$) (Toussaint, 
2006). In the 1960’s, South Korea firms supplied the U.S. military 
in the region with construction services, machinery and some 
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finished products (tire, wood). This helped them improve their 
management, organizational and technical skills (Westphal Rhee 
and Pursell, 1985).  
The U.S. has remained an important source of technology. Moreover, 
thanks to Korean Diaspora in the U.S, joint ventures with U.S. firms and 
research structures allowed South Korean firms to assimilate new 
technologies, especially in electronics, particularly during the 1980’s. 
During the totalitarian regime (1961-1987), the South Korean 
government pursued an active industrial development policy which was 
continued after the democratic transition in 1987. Reforms of the 
agricultural regime, investments in infrastructure and education, public 
funding, subsidies, tax incentives and strong protectionism were the main 
tools that the South Korean government used to achieve technological 
and industrial development. 
South Korean nationalism and culture played an important role, 
particularly in the early stages (Koo, 1995). According to Song (1997), 
new Confusionism in South Korea encouraged personal achievement 
(education and discipline), family values, patriotism, harmony and 
community spirit. 
We will now highlight the ILS that improved technological 
capabilities of Korean firms and lead to the production of new goods and 
the use of new technology in each period. Our objective here is to clarify 
the link between ILS and the technological and industrial development of 
South Korea. 
4.2 The 1960’s: The acquisition of production technological 
capabilities 
In this decade, South Korea had three major handicaps: a small local 
market, lack of natural resources and low technological capabilities to 
compete locally or abroad. The Korean government switched rapidly 
from import substitution to export promotion to encourage the 
acquisition of production capabilities in many new industries. Public 
incentives (subsidies, domestic market protection, fiscal incentives and 
so on) and attractive market opportunities encouraged Korean firms to 
acquire technological capabilities even in industries in which they had no 
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competitive advantage. In general, the technology in these industries was 
mature except for electronics. 
Korean firms took also advantage of qualified workers who were able 
to assimilate new knowledge and to acquire new skills rapidly. They 
benefited from available foreign technologies in the form of capital 
goods, turnkey plants, technical assistance and licences. Large firms 
(chaebols or Chaebols, please be consistent throughout the paper) 
benefited from attractive financial terms from Korean banks. Lastly, the 
government set up many measures to increase the bargaining power of 
Korean firms.  
To acquire technological capabilities, Korean firms entered 
deliberately in many ILS that involved different actors according to the 
production process and scale as well as the size of the firms. 
In small batch industries (shipbuilding, machinery), large firms 
favoured capital goods, licences imports and technical assistance. They 
were involved in interactive learning spaces with foreign suppliers and 
experts through training and in situ technical assistance. Korean 
engineers and technicians learned how to manufacture effectively large 
quality of quality products with varying technical specifications. Small 
firms applied imitative reverse engineering. In addition, they interacted 
with local users to improve their copies of foreign products. Lastly, in 
new industries, technical staff moved from the pioneer firms to 
latecomers and interacted with their inexperienced personnel. Thus, 
foreign technologies were rapidly disseminated. 
In large batch industries (electronics, automobile), large and small 
firms set up ILS with foreign suppliers of sophisticated products to 
acquire knowledge through training and technical assistance. Small firms 
preferred imitative reverse engineering of simple products. Foreign 
technologies have been disseminated in the same way as in small batch 
industries. 
In industries using process production (chemicals, cement, 
pharmaceutical), firms purchased turnkey plants to acquire initial 
production capabilities. Korean technical personnel entered in interactive 
learning spaces with foreign technical experts to assimilate technology 
and to perform production, maintenance and repair operations.  
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In summary, in this period, the learning spaces were dominated by 
foreign sources of technology. Large firms imported technologies to 
acquire production capabilities and small firms preferred imitative 
reverse engineering. However, all tried to improve their capabilities to be 
more autonomous and to enhance quality and sophistication to go to next 
stages. 
4.3 The 1970’s: The emergence of innovation capabilities  
During the 1970s, the Korean companies improved rapidly their 
technological capabilities in production and in product design. 
Interactions with foreign customers enhanced the know-how of local 
companies and new technologies, some mature and some growing, were 
acquired.  
The output of large production facilities set-up in many industries to 
achieve economies of scale economies was larger than the local market 
could absorb, so Korean firms had to open new markets. To have 
competitive exports, they had to reduce costs, differentiate products and 
improve their quality. A large percentage of Korean firms worked under 
Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) agreements and had to meet 
tight specifications. To do so, they had to acquire more sophisticated 
engineering capabilities. Also, OEM relationships constituted precious 
sources of information about international markets. 
Finally, the South Korean government provided attractive incentives 
in heavy industries like chemicals, the automobile industry, steel or 
shipbuilding. 
The combination of all these factors resulted in a more technically 
qualified labour force. Korean firms could then import or assimilate 
more complex and newer technologies. Even while they continued to use 
some of the old spaces, Korean firms could also engage in new 
interactive learning spaces in the following manner.  
First, in many established industries, new firms hired the technical 
personnel of pioneering firms to benefit from their experience and skills. 
Moreover, the new entrants avoided the inherent risks of technology 
selection by taking advantage of adaptations achieved by the pioneers.  
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Secondly, large Korean companies involved in OEM agreements 
entered in a specific interactive learning space with their costumers.  
Lastly, large Korean firms continued to import sophisticated and 
complex technologies through specially licences. Hence, interactive 
learning space between licence suppliers (especially Japanese) and 
Korean firms aimed at acquiring production capabilities in new 
technologies and/or design capabilities in established areas. In short, the 
acquisition and mastery of production technologies progressed during 
this phase through “learning by doing” and “learning by using” as well as 
by adaptations of the foreign technologies. The mobility of qualified 
workers and other formal and informal mechanisms made the 
dissemination of technologies easier. Simultaneously, the acquisition of 
design capabilities continued through the transfer of foreign knowledge, 
NSI was more and more embedded in economic system, interactions 
between actors became more systemic and Korean firms reinforced their 
international competitiveness and enhanced the range of their products. 
4.4 The 1980’s: The emergence of high-tech industries and the 
expansion of R&D  
At the beginning of the 1980’s, South Korea faced a dramatic change. 
The economic crisis pressed the U.S. and Europe to set up protectionist 
measures against new industrialised countries. South Korea also lost its 
competitive advantage in labour intensive industries as real wages 
increased. Moreover, foreign suppliers of technology became reluctant to 
supply it to their Korean competitors. Lastly, imitative reverse 
engineering became more difficult as South Korea tightened regulations 
regarding the protection of intellectual property. Many emerging high-
tech industries, however, provided new opportunities. Among them, 
South Korea chose semiconductors, optical fibre, robotics, computer and 
aircraft. 
During this decade, large Korean firms had to increase their reliance 
on indigenous resources in R&D with government assistance through 
exportations subsidies, technology monitoring, financial assistance and 
so on. Yet, the supply of highly qualified engineers and scientists at this 
time was not adequate for the needs. To fill this gap, Korean firms 
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attracted Koreans expatriates (from the United States, Europe and Japan). 
Korean-American engineers and scientists provided the necessary 
bridges with foreign experts on specific R&D projects. Moreover, large 
firms like Samsung, Hyundai and LG invested in foreign technological 
outposts to monitor technological changes and work with foreign firms 
and R&D institutes within technology clusters. Korean foreign 
subsidiaries and outposts contributed to the dissemination of foreign 
knowledge and know-how particularly in electricity, electronics and 
chemicals. All these interactive learning spaces, particularly those that 
involved Korean and U.S companies, were extremely beneficial in 
leading-edge technologies such as semiconductors, computer and 
biotechnology.  
In many industries, such as robotics and computers, companies 
(notably Chaebols) continued to use their usual ILS. New interactive 
learning spaces involved Chaebols and multinationals firms (MNFs) 
through joint ventures. The latter were interested in technological 
cooperation with Korean firms with large production capabilities. While 
Korean firms aimed to strengthen their innovative capabilities. 
In this decade, Korean companies started to work with government 
research institutes (GRIs). National R&D Projects (NRP) and Industrial 
Base Technology Development Projects (IBTDP) set up by the Korean 
government involved the GRIs and firms in selected technologies.  
In short, during the 1980s, Korean companies (particularly Chaebols) 
moved from reverse engineering to international cooperation and local 
R&D to acquire the knowledge associated with the emerging industries. 
Reverse engineering and internal R&D was for relatively simple 
technological tasks in robotics, computers at the beginning. Interactions 
with foreign companies and indigenous R&D structures were reserved 
for more complex cases. The ILS helped to establish new industries to 
replace those that lost their competitive edge and to take advantage of 
new opportunities. The NSI became more autonomous, innovations more 
endogenous. As a consequence, the Korean economy was radically 
transformed in this critical decade.  
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4.5 The 1990’s: The expansion of high-tech industries and the 
strengthening of innovation capabilities  
The Korean slowdown during the 1990’s had many reasons, both internal 
and external. Nevertheless, after the financial crisis, favourable 
conditions accelerated Korean recovery. Foreign investors’ confidence 
was re-established, many large companies were restructured and 
currency was re-stabilized. Moreover, favourable global demand, and 
information and communication technology expansion encouraged 
Korean firms to increase their efforts towards more creativity and 
inventiveness in order to take advantage of new innovation-intensive 
industries. 
In addition, large investments in basic research in universities, 
venture capital availability, attractive public incentives and the needs of 
more flexible firms in many industries encouraged the setting-up of high-
tech and innovative SMEs. 
By and large, Korean firms achieved internal R&D and kept their 
relationships with Korean diaspora to improve their innovative 
capabilities. They also maintained cooperation with MNFs and GRIs. In 
addition, the government continued to support firms through subsidies, 
financial assistance and so on. Lastly, in the case of more complex 
capabilities, Korean companies increased their patent portfolio to 
enhance their negotiation position with international parties through 
cross-licensing and similar intellectual protection schemes. 
Korean firms, notably Chaebols, reorganized themselves to encourage 
new "creative spaces." For example, to stimulate innovation, employees 
with new ideas could set up experimental spaces involving persons of 
various domains to find profitable projects in the short and medium 
terms. 
Furthermore, outsourcing needs of Chaebols strengthened semi-
permanent relations between them and their SME suppliers of 
components and machinery. This cooperation resulted in cost reduction, 
and improved the design and production capabilities for complex 
technologies. 
Also, Korean SMEs were involved together in many interactive 
learning spaces through R&D cooperation, common equipment and 
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inputs purchasing, common marketing in order to improve their 
efficiency and quality.  
Korean companies continued to be involved with GRIs in new high-
tech industries, such as artificial intelligence, advanced robotics and so 
on. Lastly, Chaebols kept interactive learning spaces through joint 
ventures with MNFs to strengthen their innovative capabilities. 
In this stage, ILS led to the acquisition of more complex engineering 
and innovative capabilities in order to keep pace with technology 
frontiers and to generate new technologies in specific industries.  
Figure 1 summarizes the technological catch-up process of South 
Korea. 
 
Figure 1: Technological development process of South Korea 
5. The 2000’s: South Korean System of Innovation limitations 
Many studies and reports in the 2000’s have indicated that South Korea 
is not a producer of radically new knowledge. Chaebols do not have 
enough capabilities to innovate radically and there are only few 
technological SMEs. Basic and applied researches are not promoted 
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enough and scientists and researchers are not equally distributed between 
GRIs and universities (Kim, 2000; OECD, 2005). 
To fill the gaps of its system of innovation, OECD recommended that 
South Korea focus on three major areas of improvements. First, basic 
research, especially within universities, must be strengthened to increase 
the chances of new discoveries and to develop new technologies. More 
interactions between different innovation actors (firms, GRIs, 
universities) are also required. Moreover, scientific and technological 
cooperation with others countries must be intensified to take advantage 
of their previous experience. Second, education policy must be reformed 
to diversify higher education and develop creative and high quality 
expertise in strategic areas. Third, industrial policy must lead to a more 
balanced structure between SMEs and Chaebols and to more intensive 
learning and innovation through more business services, venture capital 
development, support networks, enhancement of creativity culture and so 
on.  
In recent years, Korea has followed many of these recommendations. 
In fact, R&D expenditures reached 2.63% of GDP in 2003 (24321.3 
million U.S.$), higher than the OECD average. New R&D public 
programs and higher universities budgets (to intensify basic research) 
lead to the rise of public expenditures. Moreover, the number of 
researchers reached 6.2 per 1000 workers, which is close to the OECD 
average in 2002 (OECD, 2006). Furthermore, in the early the 2000’s, 
South Korean government restructured the national system of innovation 
to encourage creativity an innovation such as upgrading academic and 
industrial laboratories. 
Consequently, South Korean scientific and technological outputs 
increased significantly in recent years. As shown in Table 3, patent 
applications and patents granted to South Korean inventors increased 
dramatically between 1995 and 2005. The percentage of high- and 
medium tech exports rose respectively 36.1% and 32.2% of the total 
South Korean exports. In contrast, low and medium-low tech exports 
declined to respectively 11.4% and 20.3% (OECD, 2006; STAN 
database). 
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Table 3: Patent applications and patents granted of South Korea 1995-2005. 
 Patent applications Patents granted 
Year 1995 2000 2002 2005* 1995 2000 2002 2005* 
Number 78,499 116,886 106,136 160,921 12,512 34,956 45,046 73,512 
Source: World International Property Organisation WIPO. * Last data available. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions  
The common pattern of Asian success in manufacturing (Japan, South 
Korea, China…) shows two main characteristics. First, firms are able to 
integrate and evolve from an interactive learning space to another to get 
the technological capabilities required for each stage of development. 
Second, institutional framework and organisational arrangements 
supported the technological effort. 
Like Japan earlier, South Korea imitated and integrated the existing 
technological systems. Similarly, Chinese firms in the field of mobile 
telephone technology, entered in several ILS and had joint ventures with 
Multinational companies to acquire basic manufacturing skills and hone 
their adaptive capabilities (Von Zedtwitz and Jin, 2007). Unlike Korean 
firms, however, Chinese firms moved quickly to establish joint ventures 
and R&D to keep pace with rapid change of 3G technology.  
South Korean strategies were particularly effective in the 
assimilation, adaptation and improvement of technologies developed 
outside Korea. Organisation arrangements and the institutional 
framework were adapted to fit the technology needs. This experience 
illustrates, however, that a successful pattern of technological 
assimilation does not necessarily help in producing new technologies and 
that contributing to radically new knowledge and technologies requires 
another set of strategies. 
 
The failure of other developing countries can be attribute to the lack 
of interactive learning spaces and to the absence of a supportive 
institutional framework. Firms in these countries rarely have the internal 
and external resources to integrate and evolve from one interactive 
learning space to another. Thus, they cannot solve their pressing 
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production problems; stagnate at a level of low technological capabilities 
and insufficient competitiveness in local and international markets. This 
inability to integrate interactive learning spaces and to evolve among 
them results from the disjunction of the institutional framework and 
organisational arrangements from technology evolution. 
Accordingly, we propose that technological and economic 
development is possible only if developing countries make their 
institutional framework and organisational arrangements compatible with 
the technology life cycle. More studies of catch up processes are needed 
to clarify whether it is the political regime, institutional arrangements 
and culture aspects that determine the accumulation of capabilities and 
the production of new knowledge or whether the latter depends on each 
national experience and the history of the various national innovation 
systems. 
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